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Requirements Notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. The IKESK Application Identifier is used when the IKEv2 peer is to be authenticated and authorized using IKEv2 with SK-based authentication.
Protocol Description

Support for IKEv2 and Shared Keys
When IKEv2 is used with SK-based initiator authentication, the Diameter commands IKEv2-SK-Request/Answer defined in this document are used between the IKEv2 server and a Home AAA (HAAA) server to authorize the IKEv2 peer for the services. Upon receiving the IKE_AUTH message from the IKEv2 peer, the IKEv2 server uses the information received in IDi [RFC5996] to identify the IKEv2 peer and the SPI, if available, to determine the correct SK for this IKEv2 peer. If no SK associated with this IKEv2 peer is found, the IKEv2 server MUST send an Authorize-Only (Auth-Request-Type set to "Authorize-Only") Diameter IKEv2-SK-Request message to the HAAA to obtain the SK. If the IDi payload extracted from the IKE_AUTH message contains an identity that is meaningful for the Diameter infrastructure, such as a Network Access Identifier (NAI), it SHALL be used by the IKEv2 server to populate the User-Name AVP in the Diameter message. Otherwise, it is out of scope of this document how the IKEv2 server maps the value received in the IDi payload to the User-Name AVP and whether or not the User-Name AVP is included in the IKEv2-SK-Request message. In the same Diameter message, the IKEv2 server SHALL also include the IKEv2-Nonces AVP with the initiator and responder nonces (Ni and Nr) exchanged during initial IKEv2 exchange. Finally, the IKEv2 server SHALL include the IKEv2-Identity AVP in the IKEv2-SK-Request message. The Initiator-Identity AVP SHALL be populated with the IDi field extracted from the IKE_AUTH message. If the IDr payload was included in the IKE_AUTH message received from the IKEv2 peer, the IKEv2 server SHALL also include a ResponderIdentity AVP populated with the received IDr.
The IKEv2 server sends the IKEv2-SK-Request message to the IKEv2 peer's HAAA. The Diameter message is routed to the correct HAAA per [RFC6733] .
Upon receiving a Diameter IKEv2-SK-Request message from the IKEv2 server, the HAAA SHALL use the User-Name AVP (if present) and/or Initiator-Identity AVP to retrieve the associated keying material. When the default SK-generation procedure specified in this document is used, the peer side that provides the SK to the IKEv2 peer, as well as the Diameter server, SHALL use the same SK derivation that follows the methodology similar to that specified in Section 3.1 of [RFC5295] , specifically: SK = KDF(PSK, key label | "\0" | Ni | Nr | IDi | length)
Where:
o KDF is the default key derivation function based on HMAC-SHA-256 as specified in Section 3. o Length is a 2-octet unsigned integer in network byte order of the output key length, in octets.
When applications using this protocol define their own SK-generation algorithm, it is strongly RECOMMENDED that the nonces Ni and Nr be used in the computation. It is also RECOMMENDED that IDi be used. IDr SHOULD NOT be used in the SK generation algorithm. Applications that want to use IDr in the computation should take into consideration that the IDr asserted by the IKEv2 peer may not be the same as the IDr returned by the IKEv2 responder. This mismatch will result in different SKs being generated. The HAAA returns the SK to the IKEv2 server using the Key AVP as specified in [RFC6734] .
Once the IKEv2 server receives the SK from the HAAA, the IKEv2 server verifies the IKE_AUTH message received from the IKEv2 peer. If the verification of AUTH is successful, the IKEv2 server sends the IKE message back to the IKEv2 peer.
Session Management
The HAAA may maintain Diameter session state or may be stateless. This is indicated by the presence or absence of the Auth-SessionState AVP included in the answer message. The IKEv2 server MUST support the Authorization Session State Machine defined in [RFC6733] .
Session-Termination-Request/Answer
In the case where the HAAA is maintaining session state, when the IKEv2 server terminates the SA, it SHALL send a Session-TerminationRequest (STR) message [RFC6733] to inform the HAAA that the authorized session has been terminated.
The Session-Termination-Answer (STA) message [RFC6733] is sent by the HAAA to acknowledge the notification that the session has been terminated.
Abort-Session-Request/Answer
The Abort-Session-Request (ASR) message [RFC6733] is sent by the HAAA to the IKEv2 server to terminate the authorized session. When the IKEv2 server receives the ASR message, it MUST delete the corresponding IKE_SA and all CHILD_SAs set up through it.
The Abort-Session-Answer (ASA) message [RFC6733] is sent by the IKEv2 server in response to an ASR message.
Command Codes for Diameter IKEv2 with SK
This section defines new Command Code values that MUST be supported by all Diameter implementations conforming to this specification. ...
+------------------+---------+------+-----------------+-------------+
| Command Name | Abbrev. | Code | Section | Application | | | | | Reference | | +
------------------+---------+------+-----------------+-------------
+ | IKEv2-SK-Request | IKESKR | 329 | Section 5.1 | IKESK | | | | | | | | IKEv2-SK-Answer | IKESKA | 329 | Section 5.2 | IKESK | +------------------+---------+------+-----------------+-------------+
* [ AVP ]
The IKEv2-SK-Request message MUST include an IKEv2-Nonces AVP containing the Ni and Nr nonces swapped during initial IKEv2 exchange. The IKEv2-SK-Request message MAY contain a Key-SPI AVP (Key-SPI AVP is specified in [RFC6734] ). If included, it contains the SPI that HAAA SHALL use, in addition to the other parameters (e.g., Initiator-Identity), to identify the appropriate SK. ...
If the authorization procedure is successful, then the IKEv2-SKAnswer message SHALL include the Key AVP as specified in [RFC6734] . The value of the Key-Type AVP SHALL be set to IKEv2 SK (3). The Keying-Material AVP SHALL contain the SK. If the Key-SPI AVP is received in IKEv2-SK-Request, the Key-SPI AVP SHALL be included in the Key AVP. The Key-Lifetime AVP may be included; if so, then the associated key SHALL NOT be used by the receiver of the answer if the lifetime has expired. Finally, the Responder-Identity AVP may be included.
Attribute-Value Pair Definitions
This section defines new AVPs for IKEv2 with SK.
IKEv2-Nonces
The IKEv2-Nonces AVP (Code 587) is of type Grouped and contains the nonces exchanged between the IKEv2 peer and the IKEv2 server during IKEv2 initial exchange. The nonces are used for SK generation. ---------------------------------+----- The AVPs are defined in Section 6.
AVP Values
IANA is requested to create a new value for the Key-Type AVP. The new value 3 signifies that IKEv2 SK is being sent.
Application Identifier
This specification requires IANA to allocate one new value "Diameter IKE SK" from the Application Identifier namespace defined in [RFC6733] .
Security Considerations
The security considerations of the Diameter base protocol [RFC6733] are applicable to this document (e.g., it is expected that Diameter protocol is used with security mechanism and that Diameter messages are secured).
In addition, the assumption is that the IKEv2 server and the Diameter server, where the SK is generated, are in a trusted relationship. Hence, the assumption is that there is an appropriate security mechanism to protect the communication between these servers. For example, the IKEv2 server and the Diameter server would be deployed in the same secure network or would utilize transport-layer security as specified in [RFC6733] .
The Diameter messages between the IKEv2 server and the HAAA may be transported via one or more AAA brokers or Diameter agents. In this case, the IKEv2 server to the Diameter server AAA communication is hop-by-hop protected; hence, it relies on the security properties of the intermediating AAA inter-connection networks, AAA brokers, and Diameter agents. Furthermore, any agents that process IKEv2-SKAnswer messages can see the contents of the Key AVP.
To mitigate the threat of exposing a long-lived PSK, this specification expects that the HAAA derive and return the associated SK to the IKEv2 server. Given that SK derivation is securitycritical, for the SK derivation, this specification recommends the use of short-lived secrets, possibly based on a previous network access authentication, if such secrets are available. To ensure key freshness and to limit the key scope, this specification strongly recommends the use of nonces included in the IKEv2-SK-Request. The specifics of key derivation depend on the security characteristics of the system that is leveraging this specification (for example, see [X.S0047] and [X.S0058]); therefore, this specification does not define how the Diameter server derives required keys for these systems. For systems and protocols that leverage this Diameter application but do not specify the key derivation procedure, this document specifies the default key derivation procedure that preserves expected security characteristics.
